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* * * * *
PROCEEDINGS
DEAN DINERSTEIN: Good morning—or, continued good
morning. My name is Bob Dinerstein. I’m one of the associate deans
for Academic Affairs here at the Washington College of Law. I
believe you met my colleague, Andy Pike, earlier, and the astute of
you who got an early program will note that I am not Angela Davis.
I am pleased to be here today to moderate our panel on criminal
law and DNA science, subtitled “Balancing Societal Interests in Civil
Liberties.” I think we have for you a terrific panel that will be able to
raise a number of questions about this topic. I may raise questions,
and I’m hoping that you will raise them as well. We’ll have time at
the end of the session to do so.
I’m going to introduce everyone first, briefly, and then panelists
will each speak for a few minutes on their particular expertise in this
area.
First we’ll be hearing from Christopher Asplen, to my right. Mr.
Asplen is an assistant United States Attorney here in the District of
Columbia but is currently detailed as Executive Director of the
National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, which
functions within the National Institute of Justice.
Mr. Asplen has presented on DNA issues at numerous conferences
and published articles on DNA technology and its application to the
criminal justice system in a number of different journals. He’s on the
board of the Journal of Biolaw and Business, among other matters,
and he’ll be our kick-off speaker.
To Mr. Asplen’s right is Professor David Kaye from Arizona State
University College of Law. Professor Kaye is Regents’ Professor at
Arizona State University. In 1985 he was the first director of the
university’s Center for the Study of Law, Science, and Technology.
His research focuses on the law of evidence, on the use of social
science and statistics in litigation, and on genetics in the law.
He serves on committees at the American Statistical Association,
the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Commission on
the Future of DNA Evidence.
To Professor Kaye’s right is my colleague Binny Miller from the
Washington College of Law, where she is the Director of the Criminal
Justice Clinic. For those of you who haven’t seen her recently, she is
in that hated category on the faculty, “on sabbatical.” But Professor
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Miller has been here at the law school for thirteen years.
Among many other activities, she’s on the Board of Directors of the
Innocence Project of the National Capitol Region and in my opinion
has been the person most responsible for the law school’s
involvement with the Innocence Project here in this area. She will be
able to speak to some of those issues.
To Professor Miller’s right is Bill Moffitt from Asbill, Junkin,
Moffitt & Boss. Mr. Moffitt is a premiere criminal defense lawyer and
a graduate of this law school. 1n 1999, he served as the president of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, the
preeminent defense criminal organization in the country. He’s given
numerous lectures—national as well as to various state bar
associations.
And finally—last but not least—is Dr. Samuel Baechtel from the
DNA Analysis Unit of the FBI Laboratory, where he’s a forensic
examiner. He’s worked in the DNA Analysis Unit since 1995. He will
provide the science that all of you who in law school have tried to
avoid.
With that, I will turn it over now to Mr. Asplen, who will start us off.
The panelists will speak in order and then entertain questions both
from the panel and the audience. Christopher Asplen.
MR. ASPLEN: Thank you. As with the other panelists, I certainly
thank the law school for the opportunity to be here. I appreciate it. I
think it’s a wonderful opportunity for you folks to engage in what are
obviously very important discussions.
Also, like at least one of the other panelists, I have to issue a
disclaimer that as I am a representative of the United States
Department of Justice, nothing that I say in the next, oh, five, ten
minutes should be taken as an official policy statement on behalf of
the United States Department of Justice. With that caveat, I will try to
be provocative. But I also, after that first panel, remember exactly
why I didn’t go into patent law and why I went into criminal law.
What I would like to do in my brief shining moment here is talk,
first, about an example of the integration of DNA technology into the
criminal justice system and the extent to which I think that ultimately
integration has been very successful. Secondly, I’m going to talk
briefly about what I think will be the next big issue in the context of
DNA and privacy matters and of DNA as an investigative tool. I will,
third, leave you with a question.
First of all, I’d like to talk about the post-conviction dynamic that
has gone on in this country over the past six or seven years. The
whole Commission—the whole national Commission on the future of
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DNA evidence—owes its start to the post-conviction issue. A number
of years ago, then Attorney General Reno read about a number of
1
cases in which DNA had been used to exonerate people who were
determined to be actually innocent years after their wrongful
conviction.
And upon reading about a number of those cases, she began to
figuratively scratch her head and ask whether or not we were doing
enough to facilitate or to maximize the value of DNA technology in
the criminal justice system. So we put together the Commission and
began to look at a whole host of issues, but obviously that was one of
the very specific issues we looked at, since it was the genesis.
The dynamic about four years ago was a number of prominent
defense attorneys identifying cases in which they said that DNA
technology was proving wrongfully-convicted people to be innocent.
This was going on against a backdrop of prosecutors who—quite
frankly I was one of them—were also new to the science, but who
were unfortunately very used to what was already a post-conviction
appeal process that was not based on the kind of evidence that would
allow such specific evidence of innocence.
If you look back to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
2
Act of a number of years ago, the appellate process had gotten so out
of control, at least in political eyes, and that the availability of habeas
corpus was significantly curtailed as a result. That was based on the
experience of prosecutors having to deal with appeal after appeal
after appeal after appeal after appeal based on evidence that was not
as effective as DNA.
Well, now this DNA comes along and prosecutors, quite frankly,
have a difficult time getting their head around the idea that we’re in
a little bit different ball game now. We now have an opportunity to
do things differently, and we need to adjust. Originally we had
prosecutors who would, in the face of DNA technology, simply object
to an appeal based on the statute of limitations on the time to file
that appeal.
Well, clearly, that’s not justice; clearly, that’s not getting to the
issue of truth. So we had to initiate quite a program of education
across the United States and we began to do that with some of the

1. See Janet Reno, Message from the Attorney General, in EDWARD CONNORS ET AL.,
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (1996) (describing the former
attorney general’s reaction to cases where DNA was used to exonerate individuals
after trial).
2. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).

PANEL2PP.DOC

2002]

6/6/2002 11:03 AM

PANEL TWO

405

3

publications of the Commission. However, from a societal and
political standpoint, as the issue became more prominent in the
public’s eye, we began to see legislation being passed all across the
country that would allow for the specific post-conviction appeal based
on DNA or forensic evidence.
To date, we have probably close to twenty-seven different states who
have passed DNA-specific post-conviction legislation. So we went
from beginning to educate prosecutors a little bit better to the point
where legislators were beginning to get in tune with this particular
issue and recognize its power.
Finally, I think that the next chapter was the extent to which, four
years later, even prosecutors are proactively going back and looking
at cases absent any request by defense attorneys to determine
whether or not DNA may prove exoneration in a specific number of
cases. Unfortunately, in a limited number of cases. The D.A.’s office
in San Diego; Suffolk County, New York; Travis County, Texas; the
Attorney General’s office in Ohio have all begun programs, and there
are numerous others where prosecutors themselves are taking more
ownership of that opportunity to determine actual innocence. I
think that it’s a great example of just how far we’ve come in a very
short period of time and of the effect that DNA has had on the
criminal justice system.
Let me get to the second general consideration—the second point
I wanted to talk about—and that’s what’s the next logical step? Well,
the next logical step in the integration of DNA technology into the
criminal justice system has to do specifically with DNA databases. As
you probably know, we have criminal databases or convicted offender
databases where we put DNA profiles from individuals who are
convicted of crimes into the database.
We put these individuals’ genetic profiles, at 13 specific loci, into
the database and we compare crime scene DNA profiles to everyone
who is in there. Now, you have to be convicted first. That’s the way
the system exists right now. The next question, though, is do we then
get to the point where we begin to put into that database individuals
who are simply arrested? That’s part of the provocative part.
Do we begin to do that? We already do that with fingerprints. We
already database people with fingerprints. The issue then becomes,

3. See generally CONNORS ET AL., supra note 1 (describing the role that DNA
evidence played in the exoneration of wrongfully convicted individuals); NAT’L
COMM’N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NAT’L INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, WHAT EVERY
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT DNA (1999) (educating law
enforcement about the background and use of DNA evidence).
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how different are fingerprints from DNA profiles? The issue then
becomes . . . do you retain DNA samples or do you destroy them,
thereby more closely equating them to fingerprints? And that whole
discussion begins to kind of swirl around, and the discussion is
starting to become a legitimate and very real discussion in state
legislatures.
4
The State of Texas recently passed legislation that goes so far as to
say that if you are indicted for certain crimes, you get to go into the
database. Can’t just be arrested; you have to be indicted. But they’ve
5
already begun to go there. The State of Virginia is talking about it.
And to connect it to my first big point is if your concern is using
DNA technology to exonerate people who have been wrongfully
convicted, you have to commit yourself to doing it right in the first
place. You have to commit yourself to utilizing DNA technology on
the front end so that you get the right person in the first place.
We don’t want to wait until ten years after someone’s been
convicted to utilize DNA technology in an effort to free them when
we could have gotten the right person in the first place. Thus, we
begin the journey into the balance of cost-benefit analysis.
And it becomes a very complex proposition and at times less based
on constitutional analysis than on societal perception and what we’re
willing to do. Whether or not arresting/testing is ultimately deemed
constitutional, I suggest to you right now it’s less important than
whether or not society wants to do it.
And it goes back to a comment made by one of the earlier
panelists, and that is you don’t want to kill the goose that laid the
golden egg—from a law enforcement perspective. You don’t want to
integrate DNA technology to an extent or at a speed that causes the
public to have a reactionary response. You begin to lose some
opportunities to solve crimes, because every time you solve a crime
and you do it right you prevent that wrongful conviction.
Here’s the third point that I wanted to talk about, and a
provocative question. One possibility, one thing we could do in the
world that’s been created subsequent to September 11th, is require
that people applying for entry into the United States before getting a
visa would have to, at the consular office from whatever country
they’re coming from, provide a DNA sample.

4. TEXAS GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (Vernon Supp. 2001-2002).
5. See Maria Glod, McEachin Vows Steady Vigilance, Democrat Pledges to Protect Rights
in Attorney General Bid, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at B1 (alluding to the debate over
expanding Virginia’s DNA database to include individuals arrested for violent
crimes).
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That DNA sample would be profiled in 13 genetic loci, and they
would be run against the database. We could begin to put together,
for example, terrorist databases or suspected terrorist databases.
Every time we go into a terrorist training camp we could collect DNA
samples. We already have suspects that we know of internationally.
And in order to get into this country, you may well have to provide
a DNA sample. That profile would be put on your visa and then that
would be confirmed when you come into the country by fingerprint
analysis. If we assumed that the letters containing anthrax in this
country were not of a domestic nature, given our ability in the past to
get DNA off of things like stamps and envelopes, there’s a very real
possibility that we would know rather quickly who sent those letters.
You’re not dealing with the civil rights issues that you are when you’re
talking about being in the country; it’s a question that I would suggest
may warrant some discussion.
And I will leave it with that.
DEAN DINERSTEIN: Thank you, Christopher Asplen. Professor
Kaye.
PROFESSOR KAYE: Although I want to proceed where Chris left
off, I’d like to begin with an overview of the kinds of legal and social
issues raised by forensic DNA technology.
Let me divide these issues into three groups. One group arises with
respect to DNA as a prosecutorial tool; a second group concerns postconviction relief issues; and a third involves DNA as an investigative
tool.
In the late 1980s, prosecutors began using DNA evidence to link
defendants to rapes and a few other crimes. The issues that were
raised had to do with the admissibility of that evidence. Were DNA
typing methods generally accepted in the scientific community?
Were they executed properly? Were they scientifically valid? Were
they reliable? These were the kinds of questions the courts initially
confronted. Further, questions arose as the defense bar probed
prosecutorial efforts to use DNA evidence to support probability
6
estimates as to how rare a given DNA type would be. This certainly
7
entered the public consciousness with the O. J. Simpson case.

6. See generally David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and
the Courts, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101 (1993); David H. Kaye, The Admissibility of DNA
Testing, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 353 (1991).
7. See Nell Henderson & Marc Fisher, Prosecutors Build DNA Case Against Simpson;
Odds Are Astronomical That Bloodstains Are Someone Else’s, Lab Chief Testifies, WASH. POST,
May 12, 1995, at A1 (detailing the statistical analysis of DNA evidence in the O.J.
Simpson trial).
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A second set of questions arises with respect to the defendant’s
access to expertise in the face of this scientific evidence. When
should courts provide that access to indigent defendants? Some
courts are more stubborn than others about providing funds for
8
experts retained by the defense. The defendant’s right to obtain
independent tests of DNA evidence also has come into play, and with
it, yet another issue arises. If the defense is given a portion of the
DNA to analyze—as can often be done now—does the prosecution
have a right to bring out at trial the results of that testing? In the
Simpson case, there was no word about the results of the DNA testing
conducted for the defense. Should the prosecution be entitled to
call to the witness stand the defense expert? Or, in a different
situation, to point out that the defendant had the opportunity to test
9
samples but preferred not to do so?
Another category of evidentiary issues has to do with statistics as to
the rate at which laboratories have made mistakes in the past, either
in actual case work or on proficiency tests conducted to verify that the
laboratory correctly types DNA samples. The admissibility of such
statistics is questionable, under the rules governing character
evidence. Technically, the fact that a laboratory has made errors in
the past, in unrelated cases, is circumstantial evidence of conduct on
another occasion, which often is deemed inadmissible character
10
evidence.
I won’t say much about post-conviction relief because Chris Asplen
has already discussed some of these issues, and I’m sure that
11
Professor Miller will have more to say. Instead, I shall only mention
what some individuals think of as a symmetrical issue. Since
defendants can raise claims of innocence long after the period for
appeals, should prosecutors who have crime-scene DNA evidence, but
do not find the person from whom it came until the statute of

8. See, e.g., Dubose v. State, 662 So. 2d 1189 (Ala. 1995) (holding that due
process was violated by the failure to provide an indigent defendant with funds for an
expert to counter testimony that there was a 1 in 500 million chance that defendant’s
DNA profile would appear in the North American black population and, therefore,
that “you would expect to find this pattern once and we have found it”); Harrison v.
State, 644 N.E.2d 1243 (Ind. 1995) (concluding that the trial court’s refusal to
provide an indigent defendant with an independent DNA expert did not deprive
him of due process); Husske v. Commonwealth, 448 S.E.2d 331 (Va. Ct. App. 1994)
(concluding that it was error not to provide an indigent defendant with an expert to
challenge the statistical conclusions of the prosecution’s expert).
9. Such issues are discussed in Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA
Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413 (2001).
10. See FED. R. EVID. 404; Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 9.
11. See also Karen Christian, Note, “And the DNA Shall Set You Free”: Issues
Surrounding Postconviction DNA Evidence and the Pursuit of Innocence, 62 OHIO ST. L.J.
1195 (2001).
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limitations has run be allowed to bring cases notwithstanding the
delay?
Some state legislatures have eliminated the statute of limitations in
rape cases where DNA evidence is often prominent, or they have
12
tried to make exceptions for rape cases involving DNA evidence. In
several respects, however, efforts to create DNA exceptions to the
13
statute of limitations are problematic.
The third area, the use of DNA as an investigative tool is, I think,
the most interesting at this time. Let me distinguish two situations.
One concerns a known suspect, an identified suspect, while the other
concerns an unknown suspect. When there is a suspect, the issue
becomes the acquisition of that suspect’s DNA. How can the police
get hold of it? Voluntarily? By going to the suspect and saying,
“Would you mind giving us some of your blood? Maybe a swab of the
inside of your cheek? Perhaps some saliva?” The Constitution
permits individuals to consent to searches. But what if someone just
leaves DNA somewhere? If I take a drink of water here and leave my
cup, an enterprising police officer might obtain it, and a prosecutor
could argue that no search occurred. There have been a number of
cases like that.
Perhaps the most interesting arose in southern California over the
summer. A police detective had a hunch as to who might have
committed a rape. She asked him, “Would you mind coming and
having lunch with me? I want to discuss this case and get your help as
to who the rapist might be.” She figured that people who are guilty
of crimes often like to talk and give the police false leads.
She didn’t say, “I suspect you.” She said, “I want your help.” They
met at Taco Bell. An undercover police officer posed as an
employee. The detective bought her suspect a soft drink. After a
while, the detective said, “Here, let me get you a refill.” She took the

12. See, e.g., 2001 S.B. 152, 141st Gen. Assembly (Del. 2001) (providing that “[i]n
any indictment for a crime in which the identity of the accused is unknown it is
sufficient to describe the accused as a person whose name is unknown but who has a
particular DNA profile”); 2000 S.B. 2347, 209th Legislature, 2d Sess. (N.J. 2001)
(eliminating the statute of limitations for prosecuting criminal sexual contact and
endangering the welfare of child “if the identity of the defendant may be determined
by physical evidence capable of forensic deoxyribonucleic (DNA) testing”); Staff and
Wire Reports, 77th Legislature, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 24, 2001, at 6
(reporting the signing of legislation “that ends the statute of limitations for sexual
assault if a DNA sample from the attacker is available but no one has been
apprehended”); see also Cindi Lash, Prosecutors Want More Time To Try Rape Cases,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 18, 2001, at A1 (reporting on prosecutorial support
for move to increase statute of limitations in rape cases).
13. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 9; Jonathan W. Diehl, Note, Drafting a
Fair DNA Exception to the Statute of Limitations in Sexual Assault Cases, 39 JURIMETRICS J.
431 (1999).
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cup and handed it off to her confederate. DNA evidence recovered
from the straw showed that the man was indeed the person whose
DNA was associated with the rape.
He pled guilty, by the way. The public defender said that he didn’t
think the defendant could succeed in suppressing that evidence. The
state’s argument would have been that the straw was abandoned or
taken with his consent. Issues of consent also arise with regard to
medical records. Could the police obtain tissue samples that were
taken for diagnostic medical tests?
There are millions of such samples in the country. United States v.
14
Miller suggests that the Fourth Amendment would permit the
government to acquire many existing samples without consent from
15
any patient.
The theory of Miller, which involved financial
information held by a bank, is that once the information is
voluntarily disclosed to such an institution, the individual who
disclosed it loses any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Of
course, one might try to distinguish medical records or biological
samples from financial information, but it is far from clear that this
16
distinction will prevail. DNA also can be obtained from a known
suspect by court orders. As with other search warrants, these
testimonial orders can be based on probable cause, but the lower
17
standard of reasonable suspicion seems sufficient.
To this point, we have considered the accessibility of DNA when
the suspect is known. Where the suspect is unknown, other
controversial investigative methods have been used. Let me mention
one development that started with a sexual assault of a child in
Wisconsin. A seven-year-old girl was late for school one morning.
She was hurrying along Milwaukee’s south 18th Street in a snowsuit
when a man grabbed her wrist, pulled her into an alley, and raped
her.
Six years later, just before the Wisconsin statute of limitations was
to run, an arrest warrant was issued. The warrant was for a John Doe,
unknown male, with matching deoxyribonucleic acid at genetic
18
locations D2S44, D4S139, D5S110, D10S28, D184, and D17S79. The

14. 35 C.M.R. 292 (1965).
15. Immwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 9.
16. Id.
17. See Bousman v. Dist. Ct. for Iowa, 630 N.W.2d 789, 796 (Iowa 2001) (refusing
to quash order for DNA sample that was based on reasonable suspicion); In re
Nontestimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 762 A.2d 1239, 1246 (Vt.
2001) (upholding order for DNA evidence founded on reasonable suspicion).
18. Eric Slater, Rape Case DNA Tests the Limits, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2000; see also
David Doege Unknown Rapist Charged Using New Type of DNA Analysis; Probability of
Finding Another Person with Same Profile as the Assailant is at Best 1 in
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unknown male is still at large, but the prosecutor who initiated this
practice of issuing so-called John Doe DNA warrants, Norman Gahn,
is watching. “Someday, somewhere, we hope this guy comes up in
19
somebody’s databank,” Gahn said. “And we’ll nail him.”
Is this practice permissible in light of the statute of limitations?
20
The issue is just beginning to surface. Chris alluded to offender
DNA databases, which raise important policy and constitutional
questions about who is to be included in those databases. Can the
growing databases be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures?
The Supreme Court decided two cases last Term that cut back
dramatically on the “special needs” exception to the Fourth
21
Amendment, which was often used by lower courts to support those
22
23
24
databases. Both Texas and California, have statutes that permit
DNA to be taken on indictment. Louisiana has a law that permits
25
DNA to be taken at the point of arrest, although that has yet to be
implemented largely, I believe, for cost reasons. The validity of these
laws have yet to be tested in the courts.
This takes us to the point where Chris left off. He talked about
collecting DNA from people coming into the country—reminiscent
of proposals in the 1920s to require fingerprints of all immigrants
26
and other people coming in to the country.
I want to raise a
broader question.
Why not a population-wide database? Why not take DNA from
everybody? We already do. Everybody in this room had a DNA

66,000,000,000,000,000,000, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2000, at 3 (recounting
the first use of so-called “John Doe” warrant by Assistant District Attorney Norman
Gahn).
19. Slater, supra note 18.
20. For commentary on the practice, see Andrew C. Bernasconi, Comment,
Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens Criminal Defendants’ Constitutional and
Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 979 (2001).
21. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
22. See D.H. Kaye, The Constitutionality of DNA Sampling on Arrest, 10 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 455 (2001) (considering the implications of these cases for DNA
databases).
23. See TEXAS GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.1471 (Vernon Supp. 2001-2002).
24. See DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act of 1998,
CAL. PENAL CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2001).
25. See DNA Detection of Sexual and Violent Offenders Act, LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 609 (West Supp. 2001).
26. Universal Fingerprinting Act of 1941, H.R. 3157, 77th Cong. (would have
required every person in or entering the U.S. to be fingerprinted); cf. Alien
Identification Act of 1942, H.R. 6258, 77th Cong. (would have required every alien in
the United States to appear, be fingerprinted, give information under oath, and
carry an identity card).
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sample taken, I would guess, as a newborn. (Well, perhaps if you’re
old enough, you didn’t.)
PROF. MILLER: Not all of us.
PROF. KAYE: But four million new babies each year have their
DNA taken for public health purposes, for a series of genetic tests for
conditions such as phenylketonurea, for which early dietary
27
intervention can prevent mental retardation.
With the same blood sample, medical personnel easily could
perform DNA tests for identification purposes, characterizing loci
that have no medical significance and sending only the identifying
numbers to a centralized DNA database for use in all kinds of
situations—criminal investigations, mass accidents, and terrorist
attacks. This system would keep DNA samples out of the hands of law
enforcement personnel. It would avoid the issues that arise when
police canvas entire neighborhoods, asking all men to give DNA
samples to help solve murders or rapes for which there are no other
28
leads.
In contrast, if we continue down the road that we are now
traveling, we will end up with a DNA database containing information
on a quarter to a third of all men, that is how many are arrested in
29
the course of a lifetime. In some African-American neighborhoods,
30
as many as ninety percent of adult males will have an arrest record,
and across the nation, an African-American male is five times more
likely to be arrested than a Caucasian male to be arrested for murder,
31
rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. As a result, our prisons are
populated predominantly by minorities, by people of color.
Limiting the databases to convicts or arrestees thus will have a
dramatically disparate impact. I am not saying that this outcome is
unconstitutional, but the disparity surely raises an important question
of fairness and should prompt us to ask whether it would it make

27. See Committee on Genetics, American Academy of Pediatrics, Issues in
Newborn Screening, Policy Statement, 89 PEDIATRICS 345 (1992).
28. This investigative practice is discussed in Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 9.
29. See THE REAL WAR ON CRIME: THE REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
COMMISSION 36 (Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) [hereinafter Donziger] (reporting
that “there are least 30 million individuals in the United States with a criminal
record” and that a “conservative” estimate is “that one-fourth of all men in the
United States have a criminal record on file with the police”).
30. See Jerome G. Miller, From Social Safety Net to Dragnet: African American Males in
the Criminal Justice System, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 485 (1994) (reviewing studies
and surmising that “the percentage of nonwhite males [in cities] who could expect
to be arrested and at least briefly jailed would [be] 90%”).
31. See Donziger, supra note 29, at 107. About three times as many AfricanAmericans as whites are arrested for less serious crimes, which make up the bulk of
arrests. Id. at 107-08.
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more sense to move toward a population-wide database.
Thank you.
DEAN DINERSTEIN: Thank you, Professor Kaye. Professor Miller.
PROF. MILLER: Well, when the Law Review asked me to speak on
this panel, I was very honest with them. I said I don’t know nearly as
much about DNA as the other panelists. However, I can talk about
my work with the local Innocence Project, the Innocence Project of
the National Capital Region, which some of you may know is housed
here at the law school, and the role that DNA has played in that
project, as well as my thoughts on how DNA has affected the work of
criminal defense attorneys.
I think that all of us on this panel have different perspectives on
law enforcement; that should be obvious from the remarks thus far. I
would guess that folks in the room have very different perspectives on
law enforcement.
My own perspective is a criminal defense
perspective and a civil libertarian perspective. I think more about
representing clients and less about nailing suspects, except to the
extent that suspects eventually become clients, and I’m looking for an
alternative suspect.
So, I want to talk a little bit about my work with the Project.
Basically what the Innocence Project in this area is about—and it’s
similar to a lot of Innocence Projects that have cropped up around
the country—is investigating claims of innocence. Those claims are
most often received from inmates writing letters from prisons, but
sometimes they are received from inmates’ families and friends and
other sources. Looking at those applications can be a long and
complex process. It involves trying to determine, out of all of those
applications, which contain claims of innocence, possible claims of
factual (or actual) innocence that we think might be ultimately
provable in court. In looking back on the conviction, looking back on
the transcripts and police reports and information contained in the
letters from inmates, we are searching for those cases in which, one,
there might be actual innocence; and two, we might be able to prove
it. Those cases then get referred to law students for investigation,
and if they pass that stage, to a group of outside attorneys working
with the Project who are assisted by law students—in fact some
students here at the law school.
I’ve been one of those attorneys working with the Project,
specifically with a group of WCL students, trying to figure out which

32. See, e.g., David H. Kaye et al., Is a DNA Identification Database in Your Future?,
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2001, at 5.
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cases have promise and which ones don’t. One of the things that has
become so clear to me in my work with the Project is that without
DNA and without, let’s say, good DNA to test, it is almost impossible
to tell the difference between a factually innocent person and a
person who is not factually innocent.
Some criminal defense attorneys will tell you that, based on their
instincts, they probably have a sense of whether someone is guilty or
innocent, even for those clients who don’t tell the whole story about
what happened. But you just never really know, and one of the
beauties of DNA evidence, if it’s used properly, is that it can shed that
kind of light on cases.
I think the flip side of that in doing innocence work—what I would
call the darker side—is that without the aid of DNA evidence it’s very
difficult to make a case for innocence. There are so many problems
in the process of prosecuting people and bringing them through the
court system that make many convictions at least possibly unreliable,
yet unless a DNA test can shed light on a conviction, it is hard to
challenge from the standpoint of innocence. I’m sure all of you have
heard about problems with false confessions and with eyewitness
identification, evidence that the courts still treat with a great deal of
respect. But when you really look at the science of eyewitness
identification, as a number of psychologists and other experts have,
you see that eyewitness identification is rife with mistakes.
In reviewing inmates’ letters and looking at other evidence, we see
suspected false confessions, many which may not be able to be
challenged legally on the basis of Miranda, voluntariness, or other
kinds of issues. We see problems with snitch witnesses. We see all
kinds of problems, and yet we can't know with any certainty in
looking at a particular application whether that person was convicted
based on a false confession or a confession that's completely valid.
The vast majority of criminal cases can’t be resolved by DNA
evidence.
Yet, in a kind of round-about way, we have DNA to thank for the
fact that we now know more than we used to know about the causes
of wrongful convictions. We know that wrongful convictions occur
with some frequency. In situations where DNA has exonerated
someone, it’s possible to look back and say, “Well, this person was
convicted based on a very certain, very honest, very truthful
eyewitness, but she must have been wrong because DNA says that this
person in fact could not have committed this crime.” You’re then
able to try to figure out what went wrong in that process. There may
not be misconduct of any sort. In fact, wrongful convictions are more

PANEL2PP.DOC

2002]

6/6/2002 11:03 AM

PANEL TWO

415

likely to be the result of mistake than misconduct.
DNA has shed a huge amount of light on wrongful convictions, and
our Innocence Project has provided me with a real education in
looking at these cases and thinking about the difficulty of making a
determination of innocence in the absence of good scientific
evidence. I suppose that DNA is just about as good as it gets in terms
of reliability and in terms of pointing to the right person. But it only
goes so far, a point I’ll return to later.
The more controversial piece of what I have to say comes from the
tension that a lot of criminal defense attorneys experience in
thinking about the use of DNA. That tension goes to the use of DNA
as a prosecutorial tool, DNA as a post-conviction tool, and DNA as an
investigation tool. In the big picture we would all prefer that actually
guilty people be convicted rather than actually innocent people. I
don’t think very many people would argue with that proposition,
even criminal defense attorneys. But it’s also true that in the work of
an individual criminal defense attorney representing an individual
client, it’s your duty to do the best job possible to represent that
client to the best of your ability, even if that means an acquittal for
someone who is guilty. That’s something many of you know from
taking criminal law and procedure classes from Professors Mike Tigar
and Angela Davis and other professors.
The pursuit of truth really isn’t the job of a criminal defense
attorney. There are always limits to what you can and can’t do, but if
DNA points to your client your ability to advocate effectively is quite
limited. You can argue about the quality of the DNA analysis, but as
the techniques get better and better there will be fewer and fewer of
those kinds of arguments—such as the quality of the collection
techniques—to make. These kinds of arguments can provide
interesting case theories but some of the fun of story telling in the
criminal process—for our clients it’s not fun but for lawyers,
hopefully it’s a little bit fun—has changed because of DNA, and that’s
behind a lot of the ambivalence criminal defense attorneys feel about
the emergence of DNA as a tool in criminal cases.
Many people working with innocence projects, especially people
with a criminal defense perspective, have concerns about DNA
profiling—a massive data collection effort whose target has moved
from individuals convicted of crimes to individuals arrested for
crimes, and which may in the future include individuals from other
countries seeking visas, to most of us here who don’t fall into any of
those categories.
In thinking about this issue we should keep in mind that DNA
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certainly doesn’t answer every case and is not a panacea for solving
crime, any more than it is a panacea for proving actual innocence.
Only a significant minority of cases at this point can be resolved one
way or the other with any certainty based on the examination of DNA
evidence. I’m sure that will change as the technology improves and
as law enforcement puts more emphasis on DNA. But DNA certainly
isn’t the be-all and the end-all of effective and just law enforcement,
and there are a number of well-known cases that illustrate this. Earl
Washington’s case from Virginia strikes me as perhaps the best
33
example. In the case of the Ford Heights Four in Chicago, DNA
evidence was exonerating to the best of anybody’s information and
yet it was still possible for the prosecution to argue that DNA was not
34
definitive because crimes can be committed by multiple people.
Even if a person didn’t leave his or her DNA evidence at the scene of
a crime, it’s at least hypothetically possible that that person might
have been there, so I don’t think it’s always the perfect tool that law
enforcement would make it out to be.
I’ll end with a comment of a different sort on the issue of
collecting samples and profiling everybody’s DNA. It raises some
concerns for me from a civil liberties perspective and also from a
scientific perspective. As a non-scientist I have no clue as to what uses
DNA might be put in the future. Very few of us here would ever have
anticipated what’s happened with DNA in the past twenty years let
alone in the last eight or nine years, and we can’t know what the
future will bring. It concerns me that we are making decisions driven
purely by law enforcement concerns which implement changes that
are not minimal and could have far-reaching consequences that none
of us can anticipate. I’d like to see a wider discussion of that subject
when all the panelists have finished their remarks.
Thanks.
DEAN DINERSTEIN: Thank you, Binny Miller. Bill Moffitt.
MR. MOFFITT: I guess I have to start with the perspective from
which I come. Like Alfred Hitchcock, I love my government but I’m
afraid of it, and that is the truest perspective on why and perhaps the

33. See Brooke A. Masters, DNA Clears Inmate in 1982 Slaying; Gilmore Pardon
Doesn’t Ensure Va. Man’s Freedom, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2000, at A1 (describing how Earl
Washington remained imprisoned, despite a gubernatorial pardon granted after
exoneration by DNA evidence).
34. See Andrew Fegelman, 3 Convicted of Murders are Finally Exonerated, No Apologies
As Judge Dismisses 1978 Case, CHI. TRIB., July 3, 1996, at 7 (reporting the exoneration
of three of the four men convicted of a 1978 double murder and rape as the result of
new DNA evidence). The fourth man convicted of the murder was freed June 24,
1996 by a Cook County Circuit Judge. Two of the Ford Heights Four were sentenced
to death, one to a life sentence and the fourth to a seventy-five year sentence. See id.
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reason that I am a criminal defense lawyer. I would suggest to you
that in many ways the one thing that the criminal justice system,
wherever it has existed, has sought throughout history, is certainty.
Most people of goodwill would like to be certain that when we
incarcerate people or when, in a society like ours, we often kill them,
we are certain of the result. The one thing that DNA purports to give
people is this certain sense of security that we are certain of the
result. My experience as a criminal defense lawyer teaches me several
things about that.
DNA is not the first scientific technique or method that has been
introduced into a courtroom with the imprimatur of certainty. And
we are no more certain today than we probably were twenty-five or
thirty years ago or even a hundred years ago in most cases about the
result. And what we are essentially being sold is the notion that we
can have a degree of certainty.
I’ll start with another premise, and it’s a premise that’s probably
going to upset many people sitting at this table. There is a difference
between pure science—science done for science’s sake—and forensic
science. Forensic science is often a science where a particular
position has been established.
When you look at our society and you look at who does forensic
science, it is most often done by law enforcement. It is not a neutral
party that is working the scientific portion of the case. It is the FBI; it
is the local forensic science people who have connections to law
enforcement. And I suggest to you that if you’ve looked at the
newspaper recently you’ve seen a series of articles in “The
Washington Post” about coerced confessions in one of the local
35
counties.
I suggest to you that people don’t start out with the idea that
they’re going to coerce a confession. When they coerce a confession,
they think that they’re doing the societal good and they think they
are justified in the answers that they get.
The same pressures that operate on police officers who coerce
confessions operate on “forensic people” in a high-profile case to
come up with a result that is supported. And we’ve seen this happen
over and over. If you remember the Olympic bombing where an
individual was literally tried and convicted in the press with a lot of

35. See Craig Whitlock & Ruben Castanada, Prince George’s Prosecutor Accuses Police
of Coverup; Suspect’s False Confession Was Concealed While Another Man Was Convicted,
State’s Attorney Says, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2001, at B1 (containing allegations that
police in Prince George’s County, Maryland, obtained from a murder suspect a false
confession).
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help from the FBI but was not guilty.
When you learn that forensic science is not done by neutral parties
and you also learn that the poorest of people, the people who cannot
hire an independent group to do the science, have to rely on law
enforcement for their science, you become extremely concerned.
What this means and how this operates or should operate in a system
that presumes the innocence—not the guilt—of a defendant is
disturbing. But the very people who are trying to put that accused in
jail are the people who control the science. That ought to bother us
a little bit. That ought to trouble us some. What else ought to
trouble us a bit are things like DNA dragnets. Police are going to
citizens and suggesting, “Well, if you were innocent you would give us
your DNA.”
Now, let me ask you this. In what neighborhoods do you think
these things are going to happen? And who are the people that are
going to be most affected by these kinds of tactical responses? And as
I sit here today, the suggestion has been made that perhaps we ought
to take everybody’s DNA and create a database. Who do you think—
what groups of people—would be most affected by such a thing and
what benefits would they derive from it?
Remember, we live in a society that was quite willing to intern a
group of people based on their race during World War II. We have
had outgrowths from fears of crime and violence in this society that
have caused it, in a law enforcement context, to overreact. And who
are the people whom the overreaction is most often against?
Are you secure in the quality of forensic science received by an
indigent in Alabama who is accused of the crime of perhaps killing a
person of another race and must rely on the Alabama forensic lab?
And believe me, even our own FBI lab stories—if you look at the
inspector general’s investigation of only a small segment of the FBI
lab, you will see that internal pressures cause people to do certain
things. The training of people in areas in which they were testifying
was almost nonexistent, and they were willing, in a courtroom, to
extend their expertise beyond its true ability. It’s very effective when
someone walks into a courtroom and says, “I am a scientist”.
I don’t mean to minimize the good that DNA has done, and it is
because of the good that we are willing to extend the notion of how
we use DNA to areas where it should not be extended.
So, to my other panelists who are very comfortable with supplying

36. See Jewell Loses Hope of Becoming Cop, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1997, at A14
(summarizing the continued negative consequences suffered by individual once
suspected by the press in the Olympic Park bombing).
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DNA and what have you, I say to you—I sit here today with a current
medical disability that none of you are aware of. It’s none of your
damned business. It’s none of your damned business and it’s
certainly none of the government’s business.
But I suggest to you that if they took my blood they would know
about it, and they would use that in whatever context is important.
We have also had presidents, ladies and gentlemen, who turned the
IRS loose on citizens who defected from their view of the world.
Imagine what could happen under circumstances when someone was
aware of what a person’s physical disabilities were, or could find out,
because the government kept a database.
Please understand, I think DNA is a tool, like everyone else, and
certainly as a criminal defense lawyer, I would use it to free a client.
And I certainly believe that it has a place in the context of our
criminal justice system.
But to create the notion that it is a panacea that will cure whatever
ails us in this society—I suggest that we have looked at other panaceas
throughout the 20th century, and other societies look for panaceas,
and we have seen some of the consequences of that.
So, I suggest to you that before we turn ourselves over to the
science of DNA, we must decide whether we want to remain a society
where people’s individuality and privacy are what matter and count
for something. So, I raise a dissenting vote here to all the ease at
which we say, “if we catch one more criminal we’ve made the world a
better place.”
We’re not ever going to catch everybody that commits crime.
While we should make a goal of catching as many as we can, it should
not be at the expense of our privacy and of our individuality.
Thank you.
DEAN DINERSTEIN: Thank you, Bill Moffitt. Dr. Baechtel, who
I’m sure will have interesting comments or response.
DR. BAECHTEL: There are advantages and disadvantages of going
last. One of the advantages is you know the position of the people
that preceded you. Let me start off by mentioning the same
disclaimer that Chris Asplen mentioned, that my views on some
aspects of DNA typing can often differ from those of the Department
of Justice and the FBI, so I’m not speaking for a position that they
might hold.
First of all, let me tell you something. I was sitting at my desk this
morning reading Nature Biotechnology, which is a British scientific
journal, and there’s a cartoon here that caught my eye and then I
read the article it accompanies, and this will tie together the
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preceding group with this group. Let me read this. “A new company
was launched in August to help people copyright their DNA profile at
$1500 a person. The service is targeted at celebrities who fear being
cloned unknowingly. Because material must be unique to qualify for
a copyright, this company will create a profile similar to those made
by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation that are commonly used
as evidence in courts of law, an image of a pattern created by the
37
thirteen highly polymorphic loci that had been discussed earlier.”
Isn’t that interesting?
I’m going to depart from some stuff here. Some of what has been
mentioned here today is quite true. Most of it is quite true. Let me
take you back to fifteen years ago before the advent of DNA profiling,
and let me describe a situation for you. A rape occurs. The vaginal
swabs go to the laboratory, and the laboratories run a test to
determine the blood group of the semen donor. If the individual is a
secreter and about eighty or eighty-five percent of us are, we will
elaborate our blood group into our body fluid—saliva, semen, vaginal
fluid, et cetera.
Suppose the typing came back—and let’s just assume, since I’m
making this up, that the victim in this case is a non-secreter, so when
we test this sample, using this test, her blood group is not going to
interfere. And let’s say it comes back as an O secreter, and, lo and
behold, our suspect in the case is an O secreter. And furthermore,
there’s some nebulous eyewitness account that he was the
perpetrator.
I guarantee you there are people in prison right now on the basis
of that slim forensic evidence. And when you realize that about fortyfive percent of the population is a group O—not all are secretors
mind you—you see even more the impact of the weakness of that
evidence.
So, I would put forth as a statement to begin with that the power of
DNA technology has absolutely changed the face of these sorts of
criminal investigations. If I were wrongly accused of some crime in
which I had left biological evidence behind, I’d doggoned sure would
want a DNA profiling test run to exonerate me at least from leaving
that material.
So, it’s obvious—I use DNA profiling techniques to determine if
genetic linkages exist between evidence, items, and individuals. I use
a mature technology that’s been acceptable in courts throughout the
country, and it comes as no surprise that I think DNA profiling is

37. See Copyright your DNA, NATURE BIOTECH., Oct. 2001, at 902.

PANEL2PP.DOC

2002]

6/6/2002 11:03 AM

PANEL TWO

421

perhaps the most significant advance in the forensic area of criminal
justice since the value of digital fingerprints was recognized.
Now, it’s already been pointed out that we have several applications
for DNA typing. I use it to look at evidence for criminal cases.
Profiles that are generated from those criminal cases are used a
couple of ways. They’re used, obviously, if the case goes to court, and
those profiles are also put into a national databank—a databank to
which many crime and forensic laboratories in the nation contribute
profiles.
Obviously we’re trying to link crimes that were not apparently
linked.
For example, the law enforcement investigators in
Washington, D.C., don’t necessarily know what’s happening in
Missouri. But if the DNA profiles from the case in Washington, D.C.,
are put into this national databank, the crime lab in Missouri can
check it against their unsolved crimes or crimes with no suspects.
I’m going to go into a little bit of education here because I want
you all to realize the applicability of DNA typing. I looked through
the log of the cases that are assigned to me. I have at the moment 129
cases assigned to me, and I looked at what the criminal acts were in
those cases and I just pulled out: homicides, rapes, bank robberies,
clothing that the robbers discard as they’re fleeing the scene,
threatening letters, extortion letters, kidnappings, public corruptions,
health care fraud—just to name a few.
In other words, the variety of situations to which this technology
can be applied is very extensive. Do you realize that on a given day
you might have looked at your image at an airport security camera?
A red light camera might have caught your license plate, if you’re a
traffic scofflaw. But you’ve also left a genetic residue of yourself in all
of your daily surroundings.
The cup you drank your coffee from, the cigarette you had at the
break, the shirt you took off yesterday or you’re going to take off this
evening. I can pick up your DNA types off the collars of your shirt,
the baseball hat you wore in here. That’s a wonderful source of DNA.
The tissue you blew your nose on and tossed in the trash can.
It’s almost impossible to not leave some genetic legacy of yourself
behind everyday, and one of our jobs, of course, in the lab, in the
system, is to determine if the genetic material that’s there is pertinent
to the crime or was just incidental.
And you also have to realize that today if I took a DNA buccal swab
sample from your cheek, it would take about two normal workdays for
me to get your DNA profile back. But also recognize that the
potential technology is on the horizon that enables that sample to be
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processed and the profile developed in a matter of minutes or just a
few hours. There is no doubt that this is a worrisome technology. I
worry about it.
Just like my colleague here at the table, Mr. Moffitt, I’m not sure I
always trust my government. What you have to understand, as
potential attorneys, is the sort of oversight there is of me in my use of
this technology. Well, I boil this down to about three areas, and
before I go into those, let me point out something else.
If you’re interested in criminal law and you’re dealing with DNA
typing and profiling—if that’s part of your case—the first book you
38
want to pick up is this, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence. You
go right down Wisconsin Avenue to the National Academy of
Sciences bookstore—at least it used to be down there—and pick this
up. Without a lot of explanation, this is a very astute look at DNA
profiling. In fact, one of the members of the panel here, David Kaye,
was on the committee that helped put this book together.
Not only is it a good explanation of the technology, but it also goes
into the legal ramifications. I always carry this to court and not only
to support my position. I guarantee you many of the defense
attorneys that I go up against also have a copy of this, and they’re
going to quote from it. So, it’s the first good thing you need to pick
up.
Okay, what are the three areas? One ensures that we do the DNA
profiling correctly. Fifteen years ago when, prior to the days of DNA,
the laboratory systems around this country—forensic labs—were very
balkanized in the sense that everyone had their own pet methodology
for performing these tests. There was no commonality, limited ability
to interchange the data.
Secondly, what are we learning about a person’s genetic privacy?
And finally, what do we do with the information? Was the work done
properly?
The second document you want to pick up is the Quality Assurance
39
Standards for Forensic DNA Testing Laboratory. This document specifies
that any forensic laboratory or private laboratory, for that matter,
who’s doing DNA typing has to adhere to the standards in this very
slim document.
This document answers the questions: What are the qualifications

38. EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE: UPDATE ON EVALUATING DNA
EVIDENCE (Comm. on Nat’l Council ed., 1996).
39. DNA Advisory Board, Quality Assurance Standards for Forensic DNA Testing
Laboratories and for Convicted Offender DNA Databasing Laboratories (July 2000), available
at http://www.fbi.gov/hq/lab/codis/qualassur.htm.
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and training people have to have to perform this technique? Under
what conditions can you carry it out? Has your methodology been
validated? Did we just kind of read something out of a book and go
off into the lab and start utilizing this technology, or has it been
extensively validated? And it has. What’s the quality control on the
test procedures? Do the analysts have to undergo any kind of
proficiency testing to make certain they know what they’re doing?
Finally, what do you do if the lab makes a mistake? What’s the error
reconciliation process?
As I already pointed out, we have a validated operational protocol
that wasn’t handed down on stone tablets. Some serious scientific
work went into the validation of that procedure. Most labs today
either hold, or are actively seeking, accreditation by an outside
agency to specify that the work is done under standard acceptable
conditions.
And finally, as attorneys, you need to realize that after I complete
testing on a case, I turn the work product over to the prosecution.
Obviously you are entitled to discover every piece of paper that I
generated. And I do provide that material routinely. In almost every
case that I have in the District of Columbia, I get a discovery request,
and I dutifully Xerox all the pages; I put on a CD all the data off the
instrumentation we work; and I turn it over to the prosecution who
then turns it over to the defense.
Recognize also that although my colleagues and I work for a law
enforcement agency, I’m not an advocate for that agency. I am
neutral in the process. If you’re a defense attorney and your client is
looking at trial based on the case that I work, call me up. I’ll talk to
you. I’ll explain the technology to you as readily as I will to the State.
We’re not in some tower down there that’s inaccessible.
Secondly, do we invade a person’s genetic privacy? It’s already
been pointed out, the areas in the DNA that we look at don’t tell us
anything about a person’s race, their eye color, their hair color, or
their stature. In fact there are good scientific reasons for not looking
in those areas.
The areas we look at don’t tell us anything about the tendency to
develop a disease or whether somebody already has it. And finally,
what do we do with the information? It’s already been pointed out
that it goes into a computer database. If it goes to court, it will come
out at trial. Nobody from the outside has access to that information.
Suppose I told you at the first location that we type in DNA
D3S1358 and I’m a 17/19. That doesn’t tell you anything. It doesn’t
tell me anything other than the fact that I’m 17/19. And all my
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children ought to have either a 17 or a 19 at that locus. So, there is
no real invasion of genetic privacy once we have that profile.
The disadvantage of going last, I might add, is that all the questions
I might toss out for general discussion have already been brought
out. I would point out that personally I cannot imagine doing DNA
typing on every person who is arrested or even every person who is
indicted.
People that suggest these things have probably not been near their
local crime laboratory in a long time. We have our hands full just
handling cases going to trial and getting the evidence out there to
either exclude or include someone.
And I’ll quit at that.
DEAN DINERSTEIN: Thank you, Dr. Baechtel. I don’t know about
you, but as we start talking about the ways in which one can leave
your DNA, it makes me very self-consciousness of even writing a note
at this point.
I know the panelists may well want to respond to or elaborate on
their comments but I’d first like to open it up to the audience and
ask anybody to, in a nice loud voice, ask any questions of either
particular panelists or the panel in general. We’ll try to address those
questions and then we’ll an opportunity to do some summing up.
Then I have an announcement about further logistics for the
remainder of our program.
Don’t be shy.
SPEAKER: Well, with great trepidation, I go into this discussion
simply because I think DNA is a mystery to many people. It certainly
is to me. I want to direct my comment to Dr. Baechtel. I do share
concerns about my genetic privacy and you stated—and I take you at
your word—that what you do does not lead you to understand a
person’s condition or information about their stature. You cited
examples that include things like DNA taken from a hat or from a
shirt or from other items. That’s what you work with, correct?
DR. BAECHTEL: That’s representative, yes.
SPEAKER: So, when you say that you do not have the ability to
look into someone’s medical conditions or stature, that’s a selfimposed restriction? The material you have before you really is open
to that, correct?
DR. BAECHTEL: Oh, yes. Good point. Yes.
SPEAKER: So, the limitation on you is really an ethical restriction,
and is it fair to say that those who would seem to abuse that
information would be able to do so once the government is in
possession of my hat?
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DR. BAECHTEL: Well, I can only speak for my agency, and the
point you make is true. Once you have the cells from someone, then
the potential exists to essentially probe anywhere within that DNA.
We’re not interested in that. We don’t have the methodology to do
it, nor do we really have the time to pursue those sorts of things.
Whether that might happen in the future I don’t know. I certainly
would be opposed to it. But let me point out—I don’t want to
dominate all the discussion time here—once I’ve made a DNA match,
what’s the next thing I have to do?
I have to calculate the probability of which that match being
coincidental. And I routinely carry out that calculation for four basic
groups of individuals—African-American, Caucasian, southeastern
Hispanics, and southwestern Hispanics. And oftentimes, practically
every time, those probability estimates will differ somewhat from race
to ethnic group or other races.
I occasionally have police officers who have seen my report and
notes and look at those probabilities and say, “Well, the probability of
finding this profile is most common in a black person, so should we
be focusing our investigations on a black person?” I say “absolutely
not.”
Law enforcement, in a scientifically ignorant way, wants to take the
results—the fruits of the technology—and kind of twist it to their own
means, and I always discourage that because the investigation can be
severely misled by trying to go down a path like that.
So, yes, certainly the possibility exists that somebody could take
that item and conduct those tests. No public forensic lab that I’m
aware of has the time to think about doing that.
I’m sorry I’m so long-winded, folks.
SPEAKER: Question for the panel. What do you do after
someone’s been proved innocent by DNA evidence?
DR. BAECHTEL: You take the piece of evidence which exonerated
the guilty person and put that profile in the database.
SPEAKER: But the guilty person is still at large.
DR. BAECHTEL: Well, that’s a good point. Sometimes you’ve got
statute of limitations problems. Quite frankly, once you’ve already
convicted somebody, the likelihood of ever convicting anyone else
again is very, very, very slim. It’s happened, but even if you have a
DNA match with somebody, a defense attorney gets to say, “Well, the
government thought they had it right last time, too. What are they
going to tell you next time?” You’re starting behind a very, very big
eight-ball. But basically, that’s one of the things that happen. We just
take that same evidence and we try to find the right person.

PANEL2PP.DOC

426

6/6/2002 11:03 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol 51:401

SPEAKER: This question is directed toward Mr. Moffitt. You spoke
earlier about minorities and limited access to forensic technology
because of a lack of funds required to hire private investigators to
collect this DNA evidence. Regional profiling and even racial
profiling still exist in our society. Do you not feel that some of these
defendants who are being targeted simply because of their race will
not be exonerated?
MR. MOFFITT: I think that the following occurs, and a lot
depends on the nature of the case. In a lot of DNA cases we’re
talking about some very harsh and terrible crimes. There is a
tremendous sentiment to solve the crime, to catch the perpetrator.
That sentiment permeates the law enforcement community at that
particular time. That law enforcement community is often made
up—and I firmly believe this—of the people who are in the
laboratory.
As part of an organization and as an individual, I have advocated—
when I was president of NACDL—that the science part of the process
ought to be separate and apart from the law enforcement part. In
other words, the lab should not be the FBI lab or the Virginia State
crime lab that works almost all the time with the government; this
should be an independent scientific inquiry. The poor would benefit
far more from that.
When I am representing an indigent client, I don’t have the ability
to ask for an independent test because he can’t afford it. In most
circumstances, frankly, what you learn in law school doesn’t actually
apply to the real world. I’m just being honest. In the real world it’s
very difficult to get an independent test, despite what the case law
might say.
What I am concerned about is the lack of independence. Many of
these forensic labs, until very recently, were not accredited at all.
Many of them had very few protocols. Even the preeminent lab in
the country, when it was investigated by the inspector general, was
found to not be accredited in many areas. Now, I don’t know about
the DNA lab because I just haven’t looked at it.
But what I am suggesting to you is that in a system that is fair, the
scientists remain scientists. In reality, they’re on the payroll of the
law enforcement. An FBI agent can talk to the member of the FBI
lab in a way that a defense lawyer can’t. They’re all part of the same
organization.
That gives them some esprit de corps, some sense that they belong
together. I mean, I am an outsider when I walk into that door. They
are trained to respond to me as if I am an outsider. We have gotten
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manuals from the FBI in which people are taught how to testify and
respond to defense lawyers. This is because we are on the other side
and we are seen as the enemy. If this is a scientific inquiry, if that’s
what it is, that is unnecessary. That’s my concern.
DR. BAECHTEL: I don’t really look at the defense attorney as an
enemy. I really don’t. I’ve had hundreds of cases and I’ve testified
dozens of times. I probably shouldn’t admit this, but I find what
really excites me most about what I do is not interpreting the DNA
profiles and doing the reports but rather going to court, actually,
because that’s where the unknown lies. So, there’s a certain degree
of excitement with it.
But honestly—and I think I speak for my colleagues—none of us
looks at the defense as an enemy. I don’t think that any of us feel
that we are advocating the government’s position.
MR. MOFFITT: But isn’t that neutrality in the process very
contrary to what was testified to by Dr. Whitehurst, and isn’t that very
contrary to what was found in the Inspector General’s report
40
regarding the FBI lab?
DR. BAECHTEL: Okay, we could spend another hour discussing
that. I will say that many of the points that the inspector general
brought out in that report—deficiencies in the FBI laboratory—we
had already addressed in DNA typing from day zero in 1988, when we
began using this technology. The Inspector General’s report did not
affect the DNA Analysis Unit.
Many of those points that are being alluded to here, we addressed
from the beginning with protocols and validated research. That’s
kind of a broad brush my colleague here is painting with.
PROF. KAYE: I’d like to throw in a word in answer to the last
question, which was very perceptive. We’ve been talking about
whether the laboratory is an agency of the police that will distort the
DNA results in some way. One needs to know a lot more about DNA
technology to see how easy or difficult it is to do that. Are there cases
where people have lied about DNA evidence outright? Yes.
One forensic examiner has been charged with perjury and
41
falsifying material in West Virginia. But any law enforcement device
can be misused. Police have forged fingerprints. England has moved

40. Sam Skolnik, Clean Bill of Health Eludes FBI Crime Lab, LEGAL TIMES, July 27,
1998, at 12 (detailing the criticisms of the FBI crime lab first brought to light by
whistleblower Frederic Whitehurst).
41. See In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div.,
438 S.E.2d 501 (W. Va. 1993); Rachelle Bott, Zain Changed Results, Trooper Says,
Charleston Gazette, Sept. 13, 2001, at 7B (summarizing allegations that West Virginia
forensic technician falsified findings in a rape investigation).
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to a system in which the DNA analysis is done by an independent
laboratory that charges law enforcement a set fee for every sample it
analyzes and does the same for defense counsel who want to have
samples analyzed. I would be all in favor of that.
But it is important to recognize that DNA itself is race neutral.
With regard to Mr. Moffitt’s suggestion that law enforcement
authorities in Alabama will target minorities and indigent individuals
or groups, the best way to make sure that the investigation does not
use racial profiling is to use DNA. Whether someone is black, white,
Asian, African-American, or Hispanic, the DNA markers either will
match or they won’t. Only in the unusual case where the laboratory
tests are ambiguous is it likely that interpretations of the evidence
could be influenced by racial bias. Furthermore, if the databases are
broadened to include more individuals, then there will be a better
chance of finding the person who committed the crime in the first
place. In this way, comprehensive and consistent use of DNA typing
with the broadest possible database can mitigate racial profiling.
In this area of the law, it is dangerous to say, “We’re lawyers, we
don’t know anything about science.” General protestations such as
“We don’t know what DNA will prove in the future,” are vacuous if
one knows little or nothing about human genetics to start with.
Consider the following scientific fact. Most of your DNA does not
code for proteins. It does not get translated into RNA or proteins,
which affects bodily function. Ninety-nine percent of your DNA is of
this noncoding type. The particular STR types, referred to by Dr.
Baechtel, clearly don’t code for anything, and that fact is not about to
change.
How do we know that? Well, pick up, for example, Matt Ridley’s
42
book called GENOME. As it points out, for millions of years, human
DNA has been infected by viral DNA. Much of your DNA is
streamlined viral DNA that is good for nothing more than
43
duplicating itself throughout the human genome.
We can wait one hundred years, and this degenerate DNA still
won’t do anything new. It’s not going to tell you the inherited
disability that I have, for instance. The gene for that condition, or
any other that might be socially stigmatizing, cannot be found in the
DNA types that are being looked at by forensics examiners.
As a result, I believe we could have a system for identifying
individuals from their DNA that respects individual privacy, but it

42. MATT RIDLEY, GENOME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
(2000).
43. Id. at 124-29.
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won’t respect the desire to mask our identities. The privacy we’re
talking about involves only the claim of a right to anonymity, to be
able to leave DNA and not have it be known that you were the one
who left it. The fundamental issue is not whether society should
respect privacy in the abstract or in all its possible forms. Rather, it is
whether we should privilege the demand for anonymity.
PROF. MILLER: If I could make just a quick comment? It touches
somewhat on the racial profiling issue. I think there is something to
be said in favor of the idea that if you’re going to start collecting DNA
samples from anyone, that you collect them from everyone—despite
the impossibility at this point of doing anything with all of it. If
you’re not the affected person, I think it’s always easy to say, “Oh,
hey, that’s a great idea, you should collect from convicted felons for
such and such case. You should collect from all convicted felons.
Let’s collect from people seeking visas. Let’s make a DNA sample a
condition of getting a green card.” And so on. I think it really
changes the nature of the debate. In fact, it probably changes
people’s individual thinking about the issue if everybody is affected.
That’s not to say I would support such widespread collection, but
there’s a lot to be said in favor of it, especially these days as people
are becoming more and more confused about racial profiling.
Maybe there’s something to be said for taking measures that don’t
have the possibility of discrimination.
I’d also like to jump into the debate about perspective and
neutrality. One of the things that you hopefully learn in law school is
that there is no such thing as neutrality. It just doesn’t exist.
Everybody has a perspective and a bias, as simple as that seems, and
while I think Dr. Baechtel is the model of an FBI employee, and I
have no reason to doubt him, he, too, has a perspective.
All of us are affected by our roles and our jobs. Prosecutors are
affected by the role of being a prosecutor. I would probably be a
different person today if I had gone in to prosecution instead of
defense work. There’s no question about it. And that affects how
you look at things.
I’m an employee of this law school. I’m not neutral about this law
school. If somebody calls me and says, “Should I go to AU or
Catholic or Georgetown?” I’m going to give my best answer and try to
be really fair and honest, of course, but I have a particular perspective
that is mine simply by virtue of working here. I think that’s true for
all of us, so this notion of the possibility of being neutral in our
decisions about who’s being tested, let alone the way in which we do
our work, is about as fictitious as the idea that we could ever be truly
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certain about anything. But this opinion might just be an excuse for
the fact that I don’t know as much science as I should about this
whole subject.
DEAN DINERSTEIN: We’re pretty much out of time. I would
simply add that what this panel has brought out really well is
something that we all need to be thinking about. Certainly as law
students and lawyers, we need to be thinking about it. And that is
there’s a difference between what one can do, scientifically or
otherwise, and what one ought to do.
I think “the ought” is a lot of what we’ve been talking about—the
ability to gather kinds of information does not tell you whether it
should be used and/or how it should be used. We’ve heard a nice
range of perspectives on that question and thoughtful perspectives
from all the panelists.
So, I want to thank all the members of the panel, and I want to
thank the audience for your questions and your attentiveness.
I’ve been asked to tell you that you can pick up your lunch outside
and bring it back in here. The lunch presentation will be in this
room and will begin at about 12:45. So, take a break but come back
and be settled by then.
(WHEREUPON, A RECESS WAS TAKEN)
* * * * *

